The world is deep,

deeper than day can comprehend.

/"You'll do better, Licinius, not to spend your life

Venturing too far out on the dangerous waters,

Or else, for fear of storms, staying too close in

To the dangerous rocky shoreline."

/Truning and turning in the widening gyre

The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;

Mere anacry is loosed upon the world ...

Surely some revelation must be at hand.

/What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Wither is it moving now? Wither are we moving? away from all suns? Are we not lplunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinate nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not bebcome colder? Is not night continually closing in on us?

/The sun is cursed by all men jaded;

To them the worth of trees is - shaded!

/Slipp'ry ice

Is paradise

As long as dancing will suffice

/My mind is like a jade jar of ice,

Never invaded by even half a moat of dust

Though the jade jar be obscured without,

I pay no mind at all -

On the terrace of Immortals,

I climb straight to the highest level

Churchill: "August 14th 19944./ The P.M. was in a speculative mood today. When I was young," he ruminated, "for two or three years the light faded out of the picture. I did my work. I sat in the House of Commons, but black depression settled on me. It helped me to talk to Clemmie about it. I dont like standing near the edge of a platform when an express train is passing through. I like to stand right back and if possible to get a pillar between me and the train. I dont like to stand by the side of a ship and look down into the water. A second's action would end everything. A few drops of desparation. And yet I dont want to go out of the world in such moments. Is much known about worry, Charles? It helps me to write down half a dozen things which are worrying me. Two of them, say, disappear, about two nothing can be done, so it's no use worrying, and two perhaps can be settled. I read an American book on the nerves, 'the Philosophy of Fate'; it interested me a great deal." I said: "Your trouble-I mean the Black Dog business-you got from your forebears. You have fought against it all your life. That is why you dislike visiting hospitals. You always aviod anything that is depressing." Winston stared at me as if i knew to much." "On one of his birthdays a few years before, in answer to my sister Diana's exclamation of wonderment at all the things he had done in his life, he asid: "I have achieved a great deal to have ahcieved nothing in the end." We were listening to the radio and reading the always generous newspaper eulogies. "How can you say that?" she said. He was silent. "There are your books," I said. "And your paintings," Diana followed. "Oh yes, yes, there are those." "And after all, there is us," we continued. "Poor comfort we know at times: and there are children who are greateful that they are alive." He acknowlaged us with a smile. . . ."

"Estragon: We always find someething, eh, Didi, to give us the impression that we exist?

Vladimir (impatiently): Yes, yes, we're magicians. But let us presevere in what we have resolved, before we forget."

Camus: "What then is that incalculable feeling that deprives the mind of the sleep necessary to life? A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promsed land. This devorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity. All healthy men have thought of their own suicide, it can be seen, without further explanation, that there is a direct conection between this feeling and the longing for death ... The principle can be established that for a man who does not cheat what he believes to be true must determine his action. Beleif in the absurdity of existance must then dictate his conduct. It is ligitimate to wonder, clearly and without false pathos, whether a conclusion of this importance requires forsaking as rapidly as possible an imcomprehensible condition. I am speaking, of course, of men inclined to be in harmoy with themselves ... But allowance must be made for those who, without concludeing, continue questioning [suicide]. Here I am only slightly indulgeing in irony: this is the majority. I notice also that those who answer "no" act as if they thought "yes". As a matter of fact, if I accept the Nietzschean criterion, they think yes in one way or another."

Nietzsche: "What distinguishes the common nature is that it unflinchingly keeps sight of its advantage, and that this thought of purpose and advantage is even stronger than its strongest drives; not to allow these drives to lead it astray to preform inexpiditious acts - that is its wisdom and self-esteem. In comparison, the higher nature is more unreasonable - for the noble, magnanimous, and self-sacrificing person does in fact succumb to his drives; and in his best moments, his reason pauses. An animal that protects its young at the risk of its own life or during the mating period follows the female unto death does not think of danger or death; its reason likewise pauses because the pleasure in its brood or in the female and the fear of being depreived of this pleasure dominate it totally; the animal becomes stupider than it normally is - just like the person who is noble and magnanimous. Such persons have several feelings of pleasure and displeasure so strong that they reduce the intellect to silence or to servitude: at that point their heart displaces their head, and one speaks thenceforth of 'passion'. (Occassionally we also encounter the opposite, the 'reversal of passion', as it were; for example, somebody once laid his hand of Fontenelle's heart and said, 'What you have here, my dear sir, is also brains.') The unreason or odd reason of passion is what the common type dispises in the noble, especially when this passion is directed at objects whose value seems quite fantastic and arbituary. He is annoyed by the person who succumbs to the passion of the belly, but at least he comprehends the appeal that plays the tyrant in this case; he cannot comprehend how anyone could, for example, risk health and honour for the sake of a passion for knowledge. The higher natures taste is for exceptions, for things that leave most people cold and seem to lack sweetness; the higher nature has a singular value standard. Moreover, it usually believes that the idiosyncrasy of its taste is not a singular value standard; rather, it posits its values and disvalues as generally valid and so beomces incomprehensible and impractible ... Now, when such exceptional people do not themselves feel like exceptions, how can they ever understand common natures and arrive at a proper estimate if the rule! ..."

"One must not anaylise onself while having an experience."

"The preponderence of pain over pleasure is the -cause- of that fictious morality and religion: but any such preponderance funishes the criterion for decadence"

Put some text here ...

Wednesday, May 24, 2006

Thoughts

"To what exetnt can truth stand to be incorperated?"
I was just reading Being and Nothingness and somethihng struck me. After much ado to this "Certainly I can pass beyond this table or this chair toward its being and raise the question of the being-or-this-table or the being-of-this-chair." And it struck me how experience is an infinate of possibilities. The being-of-the-table is metaphysics, and this struck me from the angle of Plato (as in when a critic said, "I see a horse, but not horseness." To which Plato replied "Thats because you have eyes but no intelligence.") And for a second I questioned how to get back to Nietzsche until I remember this quote by Bernard Williams, that he gives in his introduction to the Gay Science,
"In his earliest writing about truth and error, Nietzsche sometimes spoke as though he could compare the entire structure of our thought to the 'real' nature of things and find our thought defective. It is as though the business of using concepts at all falseified a reality which was - what? Formelss, perhaps, chaotic, or utterly unstructureed, Later. he rightly rejected this picture, with its implication that we can somehow look around the edge of our concepts at a world which we are applying them and grasp it as entirely unaffectied by any discriptions (including, we would be forced to admit, the discriptions 'formless', 'chaotic', and so one). ... He discusses fictions, the practice of regarding things as equal or identical or mathmatically structured when they are not so or only approximatly so. He is making the point, certainly, that mathmatical representaions which are offered by science are in various ways idealisations, and this is entirely intelligble. There is greater ambiguity when he suggests that nothing is really 'identical' or 'the same'. To take an example: the concept 'snake' allows us to classify various individual things as 'the same animal', and to recognize one individual thing as 'the same snake'. It is trivially true that 'snake' is a human concept, a cultrual product. But it is a much murkier proposition that its use somehow falsifies reality - that 'in itself' the world doesn not contain snakes, or indeed anything else you might mention. Nietzsche came to see that this idea of the world 'in itself' esd precisely a relic of the kind of metaphysics that he wanted to overcome. As a remark in ecce homo puts it "The antithesis of the apparent world and the true world is reduced to the antithesis "world" and "nothing""
"The existance of the table in fact is a center of opacity for consicouness. It would require an infinate proceeds to inventory the total contents of a thing."
So we have an infinate inside an infinate we cannot see, since "we cant look around our corner."
A conciousness generating to infinity inside - nothing, with a will to truth propelling us to learn to "dance" metaphysically to a comprehention of a infinity of perspectives, since every thing wants at first to "dischrge its power". I can now see why Nietzsche railed Plato and especially Christians, with the idea of a transendental essense or singularity of each particular of infinfity, eventually leading to the bliss of the "thing-in-itself" that being a total ignorace of existance altogether. There certainly does seem a certain weight behind an infinate of particulars 'containing' an infinate of perspectives, any such comprehention held in a moment of consciousness would crush you, and throw you into an alien 'world' of tenuity.
There are some, who, from obtuseness, or lack of experience, will depricate such phenomena as "folk diseases," with contempt or pity born of their own "healthy mindedness." But, of course, such poor wretches can not imagine how anemic and ghastly their so-called "healthy mindedness" seems in contrast to the glowing life of the Dionysian revellers rushing past them. - Nietzsche, The birth of Tradegy The fortunateness of my existance, its uniqeness perhaps, lies in its fatality: to express it in the form fo a riddle, as my father I have already died, as my mother I still live and grow old. This two fold origin, as it were from the highest ad the lowest rung of the ladder of life, at once decadent and beginning - thisif anything explains that neutrality, that freedom from party in relation to the total problem of life which perhaps distinguishes me ... - with me the spirit moves over the water. . .A couple more signposts from my morality. - Nietzsche, Ecce Homo